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Islamic Philosophy From its Origin to the Present provides a survey of Is-
lamic philosophy with respect to the relations between philosophy and 
prophecy in Islamic thought. In this volume, philosophy is treated not 
only as something historical but also as a living tradition, especially in 
contemporary Iran. Nasr takes the term prophecy in a broader sense, 
such that it has not only “legal, ethical and spiritual significance but also 
… a sapiental one concerned with knowledge” (1). As Nasr presents 
it, prophecy has different degrees but mainly consists in “bringing a 
message from another world or another level of consciousness” (5). In 
its narrower sense, prophecy indicates the messengers of God as envis-
aged by Islam; in Nasr’s broader sense, however, prophecy also includes 
some forms of inner, esoteric, knowledge. As far as Islamic philoso-
phy is concerned, Nasr argues, this knowledge is related to the inner 
dimension of the Quranic revelation. Nasr’s enterprise in this book 
concerns prophecy in both the narrower and the broader senses of the 
term, as it has been understood by intellectuals in Islamic civilization. 
Hence Nasr wants to show how Islamic philosophy—its major themes 
and the historical figures contributing to its formation—“functions in 
a world dominated by prophecy” (8). 
Nasr’s book is divided into four major parts addressing different 
questions regarding Islamic philosophy and its relation to prophecy. 
Part one provides an overview and evaluation of the study of Islamic 
philosophy in the West. Nasr considers the meaning of the term phi-
losophy, surveys its application to various intellectual currents, and 
examines the relation between al-Hikma al-Ilahiyya (a synthesis of 
rational philosophy, illumination, gnosis, and Islamic teachings) and 
Islamic theology in its Sunni and Shiite branches. Western studies in 
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Islamic philosophy are also discussed from Nasr’s well-known tradi-
tionalist point of view. Nasr praises Corbin’s Histoire de la philosophie 
Islamic (1964), which was written in collaboration with Nasr himself 
and Osman Yahya, for taking into account the relationship between 
philosophy and revelation; Corbin’s book is, in Nasr’s view (27), a ma-
jor turning point in this regard. Nasr even seems to think it the only 
proper history of Islamic philosophy “written by Europeans and their 
Muslim imitators” (107), which is a highly objectionable assumption 
indeed. 
Having criticized the manner in which Islamic philosophy is studied 
and interpreted by Western and Muslim scholars, Nasr devotes the rest 
of the book to discussing “philosophical questions and ideas of particu-
lar Islamic philosophers … seen from the point of view of the Islamic 
philosophical tradition itself ” (29–30). In the second part, Nasr dis-
cusses some prevalent topics in Islamic philosophy, such as existence, 
quiddity, and the relations among intellect, reason and intuition; he 
also explains how these topics have given rise to a range of postions 
adopted or rejected by various figures in the tradition. Nasr underlines 
that Muslim philosophers did not see a dichotomy between intellect 
and intuition but considered them to make a hierarchy within the to-
tality of the sources of human knowledge. He discusses the limits of 
theological schools and philosophers who restrict knowledge to that 
which is attainable by demonstration. 
Part three is devoted to the history of Islamic philosophy, treating 
that history in a manner that remains faithful to the reality of the Is-
lamic intellectual tradition, unlike “histories of philosophy written 
by Europeans and their Muslim imitators” (107). In this part, which 
draws a framework for the study of Islamic philosophy, Nasr discusses 
theological, philosophical, and spiritual or Gnostic movements. His 
exposition concentrates on the philosophico-theosophical movements 
developed in Iran and Azerbaijan, such as the school of Isfahan and the 
school of Tehran. Nasr devotes a chapter specifically to Mulla Sadra’s 
thought, which is the best example of the prophetic philosophy in Is-
lam. This is because Mulla Sadra
sought to unify the knowledge received through burhân or demon-
Book Reviews 225
© Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2007
stration, ‘irfân or contemplation, intellectual intuition and gnosis and 
Qur’ân … thereby giving full expression to philosophy cultivated in 
the land of prophecy. (224)
Despite this emphasis on movements in Iran and Azerbaijan, however, 
Nasr talks about all groups and important figures in the Muslim world. 
His aim is not to give a full-fledged account of the thought of each and 
every person or group, but to study their thought insofar as it is related 
to the issue of the relationship between philosophy and prophecy. 
In the last part, Nasr tries to identify the modern western understand-
ing of philosophy and compares it to that understanding of philosophy 
which is Islamic or traditional. He points out the revival of interest in 
premodern Islamic philosophy despite the fact that in academic circles 
the philosophical activity is generally separated from prophecy. 
Nasr’s book certainly provides a good overview of the story of intel-
lectual movements in Islamic societies. Whatever topic he chooses to 
deal with, he paints a fantastic picture, as he does when highlighting 
the etymology of such words as wujud (existence), wajd (being enrap-
tured), hastî (existence) ist (is), and so on. He writes with the erudi-
tion and vision indicating the culmination of years of experience and 
thought in Islamic philosophy. This can be seen, for example, in his 
explanation of the sense in which Avicenna understands existence to 
be accidental (69–71), or when he traces the adventure of ideas from 
one generation of thinkers to another or from one perspective to an-
other. The fact that he introduces the ideas of well-known figures and 
groups alongside those of the less known or misunderstood shows the 
breadth of his knowledge. Due to the fact that some of the material 
in this book consists of revised versions of articles written for differ-
ent occasions, topics of different chapters overlap and the book is not 
quite systematic. Nevertheless, Nasr’s work is quite a valuable source 
for pondering Islamic philosophy with regard to the relation between 
philosophy and prophecy. 
One key problem in the volume is the author’s use of the terms “Is-
lam” and “Islamic” in a manner that seems to over-interpret the data. 
Consider, for example, his statement about the divine essence: “Islamic 
metaphysics places the Absolute above all limitations,” and “It knows 
that the Divine Essence … is Non-Being or Beyond-Being” (63). It 
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might be true that for some people, for example Ibn Arabi (90) and 
some Ismaili thinkers (148), God is beyond being, and non-being 
comprehends being. But it is quite difficult to generalize and call this 
Islamic metaphysics. Passionately defending a certain interpretation of 
Islamic thought, Nasr tends to suppress the diversity. He talks about 
authentic Islamic philosophy (65) as if there were a Platonic idea of “Is-
lamic Philosophy” on the basis of which one may discriminate whether 
one’s philosophical activity is authentically Islamic or not. Defending 
a certain interpretation or a certain school of thought is not objection-
able in itself. However, Nasr seems to implicitly identify that which is 
“Islamic” with the interpretation that he favors. Although in principle 
he welcomes the contribution of all parties, such as Sunni theologians 
or rationalistic philosophers like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, Nasr prefers 
what might be called Gnostic-theosophical trends. On this preference 
he makes unwarranted generalizations about Islamic philosophy.
Nasr’s evaluation of attempts to write Islamic philosophy is another 
example of misuse of the term “Islamic.” Nasr mentions two attempts 
to write a history of Islamic philosophy “from the Islamic point of 
view” (107). What does it really mean to write a history of Islamic phi-
losophy from an Islamic point of view? Does religion in the narrower 
sense, i.e., the Quran and the Prophetic tradition, have anything to 
do with writing a history of Islamic philosophy? Does he mean Islam 
as the religion announced and exemplified by the Prophet, or does he 
mean Islam as understood and lived by people in general?  It is difficult 
to find a clear-cut, one-to-one relation between Islam in either sense 
and a certain manner of writing a history of philosophy. 
Attempting to interpret the whole Islamic intellectual heritage from a 
traditionalist viewpoint, Nasr seems to operate with false dichotomies 
and to make big generalizations. His conception of homo Islamicus pro-
vides a telling example (265–67). Contrasting homo Islamicus with the 
modern conception of man, Nasr states that the Islamic conception of 
human being is similar to the conception of man in other traditions, 
such as Christianity, Hinduism etc. If he is talking about Islam as a 
religion, and about homo Islamicus as something prescribed by Islam, 
then the dichotomy might rather have been between Islam and other 
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religions. This Nasr does not accept. If he is talking about Islam in a 
broader sense, as the interpretation and implementation of the religion 
by its followers, then the dichotomy is roughly between interpretation 
of Islam by some traditional figures and interpretation by some con-
temporary or modern figures. But this time, both instances of interpre-
tation of Islam should be welcome and deserve the rubric “Islamicus.” 
This might be because of Nasr’s use of the terms in senses different 
from their ordinary meanings. However, Nasr does not assign new and 
different meanings to terms by mistake. On the contrary, he is fully 
aware regarding his use of these terms, because they are crucial for 
his interpretation of Islamic philosophy. He uses the terms modern 
and traditional as opposites and religion and tradition as synonymous 
(260). Then by definition that which is modern cannot be compatible 
with religion. But in fact it is difficult to clearly identify the teachings of 
Islam with the philosophical outlook of the ancient or medieval world, 
and it is also difficult to find exact opposition between the teachings 
of Islam and the modern philosophical outlook. Nasr certainly takes 
the conception of man that culminated in the later development of 
Islamic philosophy as the criterion of that which is Islamic. However, 
this is simply one way of being a Muslim. It is not something exactly 
prescribed by religion, but something cultivated and assumed by some 
Muslims. Similarly, as far as our modern world is concerned, no Mus-
lim is obliged to assume blindly the anthropomorphism, secularism, or 
lack of metaphysical principles identified by Nasr as the characteristics 
of modern thought (267).
The role Nasr ascribes to prophecy with regard to philosophy in 
Islamic civilization also seems problematic. In general it is true that 
Muslim thinkers did pay attention to prophecy. But is it true that they 
all more or less had the conception of prophecy identified by Nasr? 
It is true that some philosophers and theologians welcomed both the 
broader and the narrower meanings of prophecy.  For some others, 
however, accepting prophecy in the narrower sense meant rejection or 
severe modification of prophecy in the broader sense. One must pay 
attention to the fact—which is also attested by Nasr’s exposition—that 
there was no uniform understanding of prophecy in Islamic intellectual 
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history. For example, the way Asharite theologians understood proph-
ecy is not easily compatible with the Ismaili or Ishraqi conception of 
prophecy. Hence the relation between philosophy and prophecy must 
be carefully treated before identifying one orientation with “Islam” and 
“that which is Islamic.”
Nasr looks at Islamic philosophy from different viewpoints, and he 
not only writes about well known figures of Islamic thought but also 
provides useful information about less known figures. He explains how 
different figures or intellectual trends in Islamic societies took proph-
ecy into account and considered it as something related to or even as 
the ground of intellectual activity. None of this is a surprise. Every-
thing in Nasr’s book is consistent with the ways he approached and 
analyzed Islamic philosophy in previous work. His main theses will 
receive divergent reactions, and they definitely deserve to be consid-
ered and discussed carefully. His emphasis on the metaphysical dimen-
sion of Islamic thought is likewise important, but his scorn for non-
traditionalist historians of Islamic philosophy and his assumption that 
certain schools of Islamic philosophy represent the criterion of being 
Islamic are quite open to discussion. 
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